The US Energy Landscape — MARS 2026

Overview

Taylor Robinson presented an energy-and-freight outlook centered on three forces: rapidly rising electricity demand from data centers, global supply disruption tied to the conflict involving Iran, and the widening gap between strong U.S. conventional-energy production and China's lead in many clean-energy supply chains. His central message for rail shippers was that crude oil, natural gas, natural gas liquids, chemicals, plastics, renewable diesel, and grain all offer areas of resilience or growth, but most will create targeted opportunities rather than a broad replacement for the long-term decline in coal traffic.

Robinson emphasized that several of the forecasts—especially data-center electricity demand and the timing of a recovery in Middle Eastern trade—remain unusually uncertain. He advised treating precise timing cautiously while still planning for higher power demand, constrained infrastructure, and a greater premium on secure supply.

Electricity demand and the data-center buildout

U.S. electricity demand has been relatively flat for roughly 20 years, but Robinson cited an outlook for generation to increase by about 20% over the next five years. He expects solar to supply much of the near-term incremental generation, with more natural-gas generation arriving later in the decade.
Transmission, permitting, and grid-interconnection queues are likely to be the main bottlenecks. He highlighted Texas and Virginia—both major data-center markets—as places where capacity constraints and higher power prices could become especially visible.
A hyperscale data center can take as long as three years to build. That construction creates demand for aggregates, cement, steel, and oversized electrical equipment. Once operating, these sites function more like utility complexes than office buildings, with continuing needs for backup fuel, chemicals, water, and maintenance.
Robinson described this as a meaningful but measured freight opportunity: data centers should add rail-addressable demand, particularly during construction, but are not likely to create a sudden step-change in total rail volume.
The forecast in his presentation showed data-center electricity requirements more than doubling by 2030. He cautioned that the total may be directionally right while the timing shifts farther into the future as projects encounter infrastructure and permitting limits.

Global disruption and U.S. supply positioning

Robinson said the conflict involving Iran has kept oil prices and inflationary pressure elevated for longer than many initially expected. Oil briefly traded in roughly the $120–$130-per-barrel range, but did not reach the previously feared level of $200 per barrel. He attributed that outcome to demand destruction at higher prices, trade rerouting, releases from reserves, large inventories, and market expectations that the disruption might prove temporary.

Because much of the U.S. energy industry was already operating at or near capacity, the immediate response appeared more clearly in exports than in production. Robinson cited record net exports of crude oil and refined products in April, record crude-oil exports in May, and record liquefied petroleum gas exports in April.

He also described significant downstream effects:

The Middle East accounted for about 40% of global polyethylene exports before the disruption. Robinson cited an initial polyethylene price increase of approximately 38%.
He cited fertilizer price increases of more than 40%, noting that many farmers had already secured lower-cost supply for the current crop cycle but could face a larger impact in the following cycle.
The Middle East supplied about 8% of global aluminum, and Robinson cited a 17% rise in London Metal Exchange aluminum prices, with some buyers experiencing still larger increases in their delivered costs.

His longer-term conclusion was that companies will place more value on secure supply, strategic partners, alternate routes, and larger inventory buffers. Even after trade begins to normalize, he expects markets to need approximately three to nine months—and in some cases longer—to rebalance. The uncertain point is when that recovery period actually begins.

Conventional energy outlook

Coal: After a long decline, U.S. coal demand has been comparatively flat since 2023. Robinson said 8 gigawatts of retirement had been planned for 2025, while only 2.6 gigawatts actually retired. Higher gas prices, new electricity demand, and delayed plant closures could keep coal comparatively steady through the rest of the decade, although another decline remains possible after 2030. Export coal would become more important in that scenario.
Crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids: Robinson characterized all three as strong or resilient. Ten to 12 years ago, the United States exported little of these products; today, exports represent roughly 30% to 50% of production, depending on the commodity. Natural gas liquids reached the 50% export level earlier than previously forecast.
Liquefied natural gas: Eight additional LNG export terminals were planned or under construction, which Robinson said could roughly double U.S. export capacity over the next five years. Construction speed—not demand—is the limiting factor in his outlook.
Natural gas liquids: He described the United States as the clear global leader, producing roughly twice as much as the entire Middle East, with propane and butane serving as major export products.
Plastics: Low-cost ethane gives North American polyethylene producers a structural advantage. A new plant in Orange, Texas, was expected to add capacity equal to about 6% of the existing market. Before the conflict, that capacity raised concerns about oversupply and lower utilization. With Middle Eastern supply disrupted, Robinson instead expects high utilization in 2026 and potentially 2027; he cited global polyethylene prices still running 20% to 25% above pre-conflict levels.
Nuclear: Restarts of existing plants may support supply, but Robinson does not expect new construction to make nuclear a major source of incremental generation over the next decade.

Clean energy, China, and renewable diesel

Robinson offered a much more cautious outlook for several energy-transition sectors. He said China holds approximately 90% to 95% shares across important solar, battery, and critical-mineral supply chains, as well as about 98% of the market for neodymium magnets used in electric vehicles, motors, and wind turbines. He cited Chinese neodymium-magnet output of roughly 300,000 tons per year, compared with almost no current U.S. production and an initial U.S. goal of about 1,000 tons. He also said a fully domestic end-to-end solar-panel supply chain could cost approximately six times as much as production in China.

In Robinson's view, U.S. electric-vehicle adoption will continue, but more slowly than earlier forecasts suggested. He cited roughly $50 billion in EV-related write-offs by the three largest U.S. automakers and said the forecast 2030 adoption rate had been cut in half between the 2024 and 2025 outlooks.

Renewable diesel was the main growth exception in his transition outlook. Clarification of renewable-volume obligations and the Section 45Z tax credit improved the production incentive, while state and Canadian programs add further support. Restrictions are also expected to make imports more difficult by 2028. The principal constraint is feedstock—especially soybean oil—which links renewable-diesel growth directly to soybean crushing, agricultural markets, and rail movements.

Elsewhere, Robinson expects weaker near-term solar and wind volumes, little near-term progress in offshore wind or green hydrogen, slower-than-planned development of blue hydrogen, and gradual growth in carbon capture. Carbon capture will depend heavily on pipeline access; he expects some viable carbon-dioxide-by-rail projects, but not at a scale large enough to transform rail demand. He identified long-duration energy-storage technologies as a possible opportunity for the United States to leapfrog today's four-hour lithium-ion systems with 12- or 36-hour solutions.

What the outlook means for rail

Robinson said current freight-rail growth is being led by agriculture and grain, chemicals, coal, and intermodal. Trucking capacity contracted during a three- to four-year freight downturn, and a returning market—combined with higher fuel costs—could raise truck rates and make rail more competitive. The opportunity, however, depends on railroads converting that cost advantage into service that shippers can use.

His commodity-level rail outlook was selective:

Corn production should ease from the prior year's record, while soybean production and exports should rise as farmers respond to stronger economics and renewable-diesel demand for soybean oil. He expects grain overall to remain strong.
Chemicals, plastics, resins, and renewable diesel have the clearest energy-related rail growth prospects. Much of the incremental plastics production is destined for export, creating inland rail moves to ports.
Coal, crude-by-rail, propane, ethanol, and ammonia are more likely to remain flat than to become major growth markets.
Much of the growth in crude oil, natural gas, and liquefied petroleum gas moves by pipeline or directly into export systems, so production growth does not automatically translate into proportional rail growth.
Emerging energy-transition minerals remain uncertain and, in his view, may not develop into a large domestic rail market without a major technology or cost breakthrough.

Audience Q&A

Could power generation be overbuilt for the data-center boom? Robinson said it is possible, particularly if data centers become much more efficient. However, he believes pent-up power demand in many regions would likely absorb at least part of any surplus.
Can the United States catch China in rare-earth production? He sees domestic production as essential for defense and supply security, even if it remains commercially uncompetitive without support.
Will other countries catch the United States in hydraulic fracturing? Robinson said Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and others are developing resources, but the United States retains a substantial lead.
What is the direct effect of the Iran conflict on rail? He expects the direct impact to be limited because many affected energy flows use pipelines and export terminals. The indirect effect may favor rail because trucking is more exposed to higher fuel costs, while data-center construction and selected industrial commodities add demand.

Bottom line

Robinson's outlook was strongest for U.S. conventional energy, exports, chemicals, plastics, renewable diesel, and grain. It was more guarded for sectors that depend on immature infrastructure, uncertain policy support, or supply chains dominated by China. For rail, the result is a collection of real but commodity-specific opportunities—not a single replacement for historic coal volumes.